Case Brief: Gasparyan v. Holder (First Circuit)
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On October 24, 2004, Gasparyan fled Armenia (At 19 she was sexually assaulted by a friend, whom she married shortly thereafter to avoid shaming her family. The abuse continued during her marriage and until she fled to the U.S.) and entered the United States on a six-month visa. Sometime upon entering the U.S. a friend of hers (Topalian) wrote a letter to the INS on Gasparyan’s behalf asking for an extension of her visa, but INS denied the request on August 24, 2005. Gasparyan planned for her sister to send money and come visit so she “could hire a lawyer and deal with [her] immigration status.” However, Gasparyan’s sister had a car accident and could not come or send money. When asked during her asylum hearing what she was thinking after receiving the denial of the extension, Gasparyan responded, “I was waiting for money to come so I could apply.” Gasparyan testified before an immigration judge that after her arrival in the United States she felt troubled and unsafe. She suffered from nightmares and other psychological trauma related to the domestic violence she endured.
In August 2005, the brother and sister-in-law of Gasparyan’s husband invited her to live with them in San Mateo, California. Gasparyan agreed to move when her in-laws assured her that they would not tell her husband of her location. Gasparyan testified that her mental health quickly deteriorated because the trauma she suffered as a consequence of the domestic violence resurfaced while living with her husband’s family.
In August 2006, immigration officials took Gasparyan and her in-laws into custody because of an immigration problem that her in-laws had. Thereafter, the Immigration and Naturalization Service initiated removal proceedings against Gasparyan, during which she applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture.
The immigration judge found that Gasparyan was eligible for withholding of removal and CAT protection based on the domestic violence she suffered. However, the immigration judge denied her application for asylum because she did not file within the one-year deadline and she was not so severely mentally disabled as to establish extraordinary circumstances excusing the untimely filing.
Gasparyan appealed the denial of asylum. The Board dismissed her appeal.
ISSUES
1. Whether the Board correctly determined that Gasparyan did not make a showing of “extraordinary circumstances.”
2. Whether the Board erred by failing to analyze her extraordinary circumstances claim using the appropriate “three-part test” derived from 8 C.F.R. § 1208.4(a)(5).
RULE
1) Petitioner must establish that her mental illness constituted “extraordinary circumstances directly related” to her delay in filing for asylum within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D) and 8 C.F.R. § 1208.4(a)(5)
2) The courts jurisdiction to review mixed questions of law and fact is limited to instances where the underlying facts are “undisputed.”
3) Before assessing the three factors, a court must first determine that the alien’s circumstances were, in fact, “extraordinary.”
4) The three prongs test derived from 8 C.F.R. § 1208.4(a)(5), which states that extraordinary circumstances may excuse the filing of an untimely asylum application if the applicant can demonstrate: [1] that the circumstances were not intentionally created by the alien through his or her own action or inaction, [2] that those circumstances were directly related to the alien’s failure to file the application within the 1-year period, and [3] that the delay was reasonable under the circumstances.
HOLDING
1. Petitioner did not establish that her mental illness constituted “extraordinary circumstances directly related” to her delay in filing for asylum within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D) and 8 C.F.R. § 1208.4(a)(5)
2. The court’s jurisdiction in cases where there are questions of law and fact are limited to instances where the underlying facts are, as in this case, “undisputed.”
3. Before assessing the three factors, a court must first determine that the alien’s circumstances were, in fact, “extraordinary,” and in this case the record show’s petitioner did not show “extraordinary” circumstances.
4. Even assuming the petitioner showed “extraordinary” circumstances, the record does not establish she would be able to satisfy the three-prong test under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.4(a)(5).
REASONING
A. Jurisdiction to Review “Extraordinary Circumstances” Determination Based on Disputed Facts.
To excuse her untimely asylum application, Gasparyan must establish that her psychiatric problems constituted extraordinary circumstances “directly related” to her delay in filing for asylum within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D) and 8 C.F.R. § 1208.4(a)(5). The court concluded that the though Gasparyan claimed the delay was because of her psychiatric problems, the record indicated otherwise because she lacked the money to hire an attorney and initiate the process. Similarly, Dr. Good testified that Gasparyan had explained to him that her delay was due to lack of funds and the language barrier, in addition to psychological trauma. Thus, the record reveals that the relation between Gasparyan’s mental disabilities and her failure to meet the one-year deadline was far from an “admitted or established” historical fact. Husyev, 528 F.3d at 1178. Because the record was showed “disputed facts” the court reasoned that its jurisdiction to review mixed questions of law and fact is limited to instances where the underlying facts are “undisputed,” as they are here, the court lacked jurisdiction to review the Board’s extraordinary circumstances determination. Therefore, the court dismiss Gasparyan’s petition challenging the merits of the Board’s extraordinary circumstances determination for lack of jurisdiction.
B. Legal Standard for Analyzing “Extraordinary Circumstances” Claim
Gasparyan argues that the Board erred as a matter of law by applying an incorrect legal standard when it failed to analyze her extraordinary circumstances claim using the requisite “three-part test.” Whether the Board applied the correct legal standard is a question of law, see Rodriguez-Rivera v. U.S. Dep’t of Immigration & Naturalization, 848 F.2d 998, 1001 (9th Cir. 1988), and thus we have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D).
The three prongs of the test derived from 8 C.F.R. § 1208.4(a)(5), which states that extraordinary circumstances may excuse the filing of an untimely asylum application if the applicant can demonstrate: [1] that the circumstances were not intentionally created by the alien through his or her own action or inaction, [2] that those circumstances were directly related to the alien’s failure to file the application within the 1-year period, and [3] that the delay was reasonable under the circumstances.
While Gasparyan contended that the Board “made no findings” regarding any of the three factors listed in § 1208.4(a)(5) and therefore did not apply the pertinent regulation, the court determined that the extraordinary circumstances are criteria for assessing whether extraordinary circumstances may excuse an untimely asylum application. Also, before assessing the three factors, the court concluded that the Board must first determine that the alien’s circumstances were, in fact, extraordinary. Looking to Section 1208.4(a)(5) of the relevant code, which contains a non-exhaustive list of circumstances that may be considered extraordinary, including “[s]erious illness or mental or physical disability.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.4(a)(5)(i), an alien’s circumstances are “extraordinary” if they fall within one of the examples listed or are of a similar nature or seriousness. Since the Board concluded that Gasparyan failed to present extraordinary circumstances, it was unnecessary for it to consider the three factors.
Furthermore, the court reasoned that even if the Board was required to consider the three factors, although the Board did not explicitly link each of its reasons for denying her extraordinary circumstances claim to one of the three factors in § 1208.4(a)(5), it did provide reasons that correspond to the factors listed in the regulation (For example, the Board noted that Gasparyan claimed that she delayed in applying for asylum because she was living with her husband’s brother, which rekindled the emotional trauma caused by her abusive husband). Also, the court mentioned that the applicant bears burden of establishing first, second, “and” third factor). Thus, the court concluded, The Board applied the correct legal standard and gave legitimate reasons for its conclusion.
CONCLUSION: The court denied petitioners relief to the extent she seeks.